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Exclusion and Deportation: Some Avenues
of Relief for the Alien
ELWIN GRIFFITH*
This Article examines statutory remedies available to aliens
whose violation of the immigration laws would ordinarily
subject them to deportation or exclusion. Mr. Griffith analy-
zes sections 241(f), 212(c), and the suspension of deportation
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act in conjunc-
tion with his evaluation of judicial interpretation of congres-
sional intent. He concludes that troublesome construction of
the Act has been caused by different judicial approaches to
the purposes and philosophy of the immigration legislation.
The author highlights the difficulties, discusses the causes
and effects, and proposes solutions to problematical applica-
tion of the Act.
INTRODUCTION
As the influx of immigrants continues unabated,' many aliens who
are illegally in the United States yearn to become lawful permanent
residents. For some aliens the prospect of expulsion or deportation
seems more real than imagined as a result of their protracted stay in
this country beyond the authorized period. 2 Others who have become
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1. The total number of immigrants admitted to the United States in the fiscal
year 1975 was 386,194. Between the fiscal years 1961-1970, the total number
admitted was 3,321,677. [1975] INS ANN. REP. 31.
2. During the fiscal year 1975, 679,252 aliens were expelled for one reason or
another. Of these, 23,438 were deported and the remaining 655,814 were re-
quired to depart. Id. at 90. An alien who is coming to the United States must
qualify either for an immigrant or non-immigrant visa. If he is a non-immigrant,
this individual is admitted for a specific period of time and must seek an
appropriate extension if a longer stay in the United States is desired. If the alien
permanent residents suddenly face deportation because of an in-
fringement of the immigration laws subsequent to their entry.3 The
difficulty occasioned by the implementation of a deportation order
can be readily appreciated, particularly if the affected alien has
established close family relationships within the United States. The
experience is no less disconcerting if the alien is excluded on his
return to these shores after a temporary journey abroad.4 Congress
was well aware of the competing equities when it provided for statu-
tory relief to some aliens whose violation of the immigration laws
would ordinarily subject them to deportation or exclusion.
This Article examines a few of the statutory remedies available to
such aliens. Some relief is available when the overriding con-
sideration is close family relationships. Other relief is available when
an alien has resided in the United States for a certain period of time
and departure would constitute considerable hardship for him or his
family. While Congress' objective is clear in most cases, sometimes
judicial interpretation of the applicable statutory provisions results
in denial of an alien's eligibility. It might be instructive to peruse the
judicial trend in order to ascertain whether Congress' intentions are
being honored.
SECTION 241(f) AND THE ALIEN
The historical foundations of section 241(f)5 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (Act) suggest that the section was enacted to
lingers here without permission, he is deemed to be deportable for being present
in the United States in violation of the law. Immigration and Nationality Act §
241(a)(2), (9), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2), (9) (1970) [The Immigration and Nationality Act
is hereinafter cited as I. & N. Act). Most of the aliens who extend their stay
without permission, and are subsequently apprehended, are allowed to leave the
'country at their own expense, thereby avoiding deportation. The principal dis-
ability relating to an alien's deportation is the alien's inability to return to the
United States without permission of the Attorney General. Id. § 212(a)(16)-(17), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(16)-(17).
3. The 18 general classes of deportable aliens include immigrants and non-
immigrants alike, and the statute covers a wide range of situations, from an
alien's becoming a public charge to an alien's conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude. Id. § 241(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West Supp. 1977).
4. The 32 general classes of excludable aliens also cover a very wide range,
Technically, every time an alien applies for admission the alien is subject to
exclusion if he falls within one of the classes. Id. § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1970),
as amended by Act of Oct. 12, 1976, Pub. L. 94-484, § 601(a), 90 Stat. 2300; Act of
Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. 94-571, §§ 5, 7(d), 90 Stat. 2705, 2706.
5. Id. § 241(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f), provides as follows:
The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of aliens
within the United States on the ground that they were excludable at the
time of entry as aliens who have sought to procure, or have procured
visas or other documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or
misrepresentation shall not apply to an alien otherwise admissible at the
time of entry who is the spouse, parent, or a child of a United States
citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
[VOL. 15: 79, 1977] Relief from Exclusion and Deportation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
provide relief in certain cases to aliens whose fraudulent entry into
the United States made them subject to deportation by the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS). The intent of Congress was to
exclude such aliens'from this harsh sanction if they had subsequently
established close family relationships with American citizens or per-
manent residents. A literal application of the section would restrict
the benefits of section 241(f) to those aliens who are charged with
entry in violation of section 212(a)(19)' because of their willful misrep-
resentations.7 The difficulty arises because an alien's willful misrep-
resentation may result in the issuance of an invalid entry document.
In this event, the INS can seek deportation through section 241(a)(1)8
based on the alien's excludability at entry under section 212(a)(19)
because of the fraud or under section 212(a)(20)9 because of the
invalid visa. In this situation, it has been argued that the preferment
of charges by the INS under section 212(a)(20) does not allow the
alien to qualify for the benefits of section 241(f).1 ° The basis for that
contention is rooted in the theory that the possession of an invalid
document or visa is a different ground for deportation, and that
section 241(f) is available to the alien only if the deportation charge
under section 241(a)(1) is predicated on excludability at entry be-
cause of a section 212(a)(19) fraud.
The precursor of present § 241(f) was § 7 of the 1957 Act, which accommodated
not only those aliens who had secured entry by fraud and had subsequently
established close family relationships, but also those alien refugees who had
made representations in securing entry into the United States to avoid persecu-
tion within their native lands. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 7, 71
Stat. 640-41.
6. I. & N. Act § 212(a)(19), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1970) provides as follows:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following
classes of aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded
from admission into the United States:
(19) Any alien who seeks to procure, or has sought to procure, or has
procured a visa or other documentation, or seeks to enter the United
States, by fraud, or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact.
7. INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966).
8. I. & N. Act § 241(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1970), provides as follows:
(a) Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall,
upon the order of the Attorney General, be deported who-
(1) at the time of entry was within one or more of the classes of
aliens excludable by the law existing at the time of such entry.
9. Id. § 212(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (1970). Under this section, an alien is
not eligible for admission unless he possesses a valid visa or other valid entry
document.
10. Escobar Ordonez v. INS, 526 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1976); Castro-Guerrero v.
INS, 515 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1975).
The same problem arises in other ways. It may be that the alien has
secured entry into the United States by a false representation of
United States citizenship. In this event, he would be deportable not
only under section 241(a)(1) but also under section 241(a)(2). 11 Under
the former section, he would be within the class of aliens excludable
at the time of entry because of willful misrepresentation; under the
latter section, he would be excludable because of entry into the
United States without inspection. In the case of entry without in-
spection, an alien could not rely on the relief provisions of section
241(f) because such an entry has been regarded as an independent
ground for deportation which is not at all allied with section 241(f). 2
It is submitted that in cases like these the alien should benefit from
section 241(f) and that the existence of separate deportation grounds
in the statutory scheme should not be used to avoid the application of
section 241(f). This is suggested because the basic inquiry should be
whether the alien has entered the United States through fraudulent
conduct, whether he was otherwise admissible at the time of that
entry, and whether he is the spouse, parent, or child of a United
States citizen or of a permanent resident. If the deportation charge is
directly related to the fraud, then the alien should still be deemed
eligible for statutory relief.
In INS v. Errico," two aliens had secured entry into the United
States based on misrepresentations which granted them priority
status under the immigration scheme. Instead of proceeding for de-
portation under the section dealing with fraud or misrepresentation,
the INS proceeded under another section which dealt with the docu-
mentary requirements of entering aliens. The Court correctly con-
cluded that section 241(f) would be operative to waive any deporta-
tion charge that resulted directly from the misrepresentation, even if
the INS relied on another provision of the immigration law to effect
the alien's deportation. 4 Furthermore, the Court interpreted the
"otherwise admissible" requirement in a way that permitted the
11. There are 18 general classes of deportable aliens. An alien who has en-
gaged in fraud may be deportable based not only on excludability at entry but
also on presence in the United States in violation of law. Thus, a single act may
give rise to preferment of charges by the INS under alternative sections. I. & N.
Act § 241(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1970) provides as follows:
(a) Any alien in the United States (including an alien crewman) shall,
upon the order of the Attorney General, be deported who-
(2) entered the United States without inspection or at any time or
place other than as designated by the Attorney General or is in the
United States in violation of this chapter or in violation of any other
law of the United States.
12. Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619 (1975).
13. 385 U.S. 214 (1966).
14. Id. at 217.
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statute to do its work. This requirement permitted the alien to avoid
deportation if there was no other disabling feature barring admis-
sion.
A similar question arose in Reid v. INS. 5 In that case, the alien had
falsely represented that he was a United States citizen and had
secured entry into the United States. The INS did not seek deporta-
tion on the basis of the alien's excludability at entry but relied
instead on the theory that the alien had entered the United States
without inspection in violation of section 241(a)(2). 6 The Court in
Reid found that the alien could not depend on section 241(f) to avoid
deportation because his transgressions had met the independent
statutory test of section 241(a)(2).
An interesting feature of section 241(a)(2) is that it subjects an
alien to deportation not only if he entered without inspection, but
also if he is in the United States in violation of the immigration law.
An appropriate query is whether the INS should be allowed to avoid
the application of section 241(f) by seeking the alien's deportation
under section 241(a)(2). It is submitted that the existence of such
discretion in the INS abrogates a remedy which Congress apparently
intended for those who, having been otherwise admissible at entry,
have established close family relationships within the United States.
The commission of fraud will of necessity result in either the
issuance of invalid documents or the entry of the alien into the
United States without appropriate documentation. In such a case, it
would seem that the chain of events begins with the alien's fraudu-
lent conduct and, therefore, the alien's subsequent illegal status
ought not to be permitted to obscure the alien's initial transgression.
One would think that the admonition of the Supreme Court in Errico
would be followed concerning the application of section 241(f) to any
charge resulting directly from the alien's misrepresentation.
It is here urged that an alien who has avoided inspection as an alien
or who is in the United States in violation of the immigration laws
should not be automatically deemed ineligible for the protection of
section 241(f). The INS might suggest that the alien is illegally in the
United States because he has not secured a valid document and
consequently his deportation should be predicated on section
15. 420 U.S. 619 (1975).
16. Id. at 622.
241(a)(2). However, the invalidity of the particular document may
rest on the fraud committed by the alien at the time of issuance of the
visa or at the time of entry. It would seem, therefore, that the appro-
priate method of determining the alien's eligibility for relief is to
concentrate on the origin of the invalid document. In the same way
that the Errico decision prevented the INS from denying the alien the
protection of section 241(f) simply because he did not meet the ap-
propriate documentary requirements, the alien should similarly not
be denied protection simply because the INS may deem him to be in
the United States in violation of another section.
17
When it is recalled that the basic thrust of section 241(f) is to allow
aliens with close family relationships to remain in the United States
despite their fraudulent conduct, 18 then any ambiguity in statutory
language should be resolved in favor of the alien. Therefore, fraudu-
lent conduct resulting in the alien's illegal status in the United States
or in the alien's entry into the United States through superficial
interrogation should not deprive him of the remedy of section 241(f).
An alternative interpretation is entirely possible. First, it may be
suggested that an entry without inspection can be restricted to those
circumstances when the alien has entered the United States surrep-
titiously and, therefore, has avoided the detection of the immigration
authorities. Second, the language of section 241(a)(2) dealing with an
alien's illegal status in the United States can easily apply even
though an alien may not have committed fraud in securing a visa or
entry. If an alien remains in the United States beyond the period
permitted by the INS, he is in violation of the immigration law and is
therefore deportable under section 241(a)(2). Thus, the section is fully
operative within the statutory scheme under this kind of interpreta-
tion.
It is not to be assumed that the mere perpetration of fraud concern-
ing American citizenship automatically results in an unchallenged
entry into the United States. 9 At first blush the language "entry
17. In Errico, the aliens' fraud resulted in their avoidance of the quota restric-
tions imposed by the I. & N. Act, and they were, therefore, deportable under
§ 241(a)(1) because they were excludable at the time of entry. Mr. Errico
had gained his first preference quota status because of his misrepresentation
that he was a skilled mechanic, and the other alien involved, Miss Scott, gained
non-quota status because of her purported marriage to a United States citizen.
Neither of their visas was therefore valid. I. & N. Act § 211(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a)
(1970).
18. H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1961). See also, H.R. REP. No.
1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1957); S. REP. No. 1057, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1957), for the historical significance of the predecessor statute, § 7 of the 1957
Act.
19. I. & N. Act § 235(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1970), provides in part as follows:
Any person coming into the United States may be required to state
under oath the purpose or purposes for which he comes, the length of
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without inspection" suggests that the alien has avoided all interroga-
tion and has somehow entered the United States without being sub-
jected to any inquiry from the immigration authorities. Surely if the
alien feigns citizenship and is admitted to the United States on this
basis, it cannot be said that he has entered without inspection. The
alien must convince some authority at the point of entry that he is
indeed a citizen of the United States; and even though such an
inspection may be perfunctory, it is indeed a subjection to interroga-
tion. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to suggest that an entry without
inspection is the same as an entry with partial inspection. Therefore,
when an alien is subjected to brief questioning because of his assert-
ed American citizenship, he has in fact had an inspection, although
that inspection is not as thorough as it might have been if the asser-
tion had not been made.
Even in the case of aliens entering as aliens, immigration au-
thorities may engage in gradations of inspections, depending on the
particular alien and his country of origin.20 It cannot be said that an
time he intends to remain in the United States, whether or not he intends
to remain in the United States permanently and, if an alien, whether he
intends to become a citizen thereof, and such other items of information
as will aid the immigration officer in determining whether he is a nation-
al of the United States or an alien and, if the latter, whether he belongs
to any of the excluded classes enumerated in section 1182 ....
This section has a caption "Inspection by Immigration Officers: (a) Powers of
Officers." An inspection officer is given broad discretion in determining the
status of any person seeking entry into the United States. In that sense the
officer is engaging in an inspection. If the inspection provides the wrong infor-
mation or no information at all, this has to do with the success or failure of the
inspection in eliciting the required information. It is the alien's successful ploy
that aborts a full inspection. But a premature termination of the inspection
process is by no means synonymous with an entry without inspection. If the
requirement is that the alien must be inspected as an alien, then it is respectfully
submitted that § 241(a)(2) ought to stipulate that the inspection required is one
concerning the alien's entry in his capacity as an alien.
20. For example, the INS is engaged in the Caribbean Investigations Coordi-
nation Program to prevent undesirable aliens front Latin America from enter-
ing the United States. Therefore, it is probable than an alien from that area may
receive closer attention than an alien from another part of the world which does
not send many visitors to this country. See [1975] INS ANN. REP. 17; 1 C. GORDON
& H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.16d (rev. ed. 1975). The
inspection powers of immigration officers, however, are not restricted to aliens.
Immigration officers may interrogate any person coming into the United States
about his purpose for coming, the period of time he intends to remain
here, and may elicit any other information which would be helpful in determin-
ing whether that individual is an American citizen or an alien. I. & N. Act §
235(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1970). Such authority is contained in a general section
dealing with the inspection powers of immigration officers. While it must be
conqeded that the inspection ritual for aliens is much more extensive than that
alien who is admitted into the United States without an intensive
interrogation or inspection has not, therefore, been inspected within
the meaning of the statute. Why then should it be any different when
the same alien is admitted on the basis of a claim of American
citizenship? If indeed an allegation of American citizenship is re-
garded by Congress as a far more serious indiscretion than the gener-
al fraud contemplated in section 241(f), then that exception should
receive special recognition in the statute and should not be left to
judicial interpretation.
Section 241(f) does not restrict its relief only to those aliens who
have secured visas by fraud. It relates also to those aliens who se-
cured entry by fraud.21 Thus, its coverage may extend to aliens who
possess no documents because of their success in avoiding the docu-
mentary requirements of entering aliens through a false assertion of
citizenship. It is not entirely clear why Congress would have intended
to exclude fraud associated with the assertion of citizenship and did
not specifically set it out as an exception in the section. Because one
type of fraud might conceivably facilitate matters for the deceptive
alien should be no reason for treating it differently in construing the
statute unless it can be clearly shown that this was the intent of
Congress. The type of fraud which results in less vigilance by the
immigration authorities should not necessarily be deprived of the
protection of section 241(f).
Since the Reid decision, at least one court has granted an alien the
benefit of section 241(f)-in spite of the INS's preference for a charge
of improper documentation. The alien in Persaud v. INS 22 was not
entitled to enter the United States as an immigrant because his
sponsoring wife had died before his entry.2 3 Because he did not
for citizens, there is sufficient language in the section to suggest that Congress
did not intend that persons alleging citizenship could wander aimlessly through
the ports of entry into the United States. If an alien has entered the United
States at a place other than one designated by the Attorney General, it is likely
that he has entered without confrontation and without subjection to official
enquiry. If the inspection requirements of § 241(a)(2) are construed in this way,
the language of the section becomes more meaningful.
21. I. & N. Act § 241(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (1970). The point is that fraud
involved in the acquisition of documents and in an entry without documents are
both covered. If an alien relies on a false assertion of citizenship, the alien is
looking towards entry without the documents traditionally required of aliens. It
is stretching the imagination to suggest that Congress intended to exclude a
fraudulent entry based on a false citizenship claim but somehow did not speci-
fically say so.
22. 537 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1976).
23. Since the alien's deceased wife was an American citizen, the alien was an
"immediate relative" and could be admitted as a lawful permanent resident
without regard to the numerical limitations of the I. & N. Act. However, since his
wife died before his admission, his status as an "immediate relative" ended and
he was not therefore entitled to admission on that basis. See I. & N. Act §
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possess the proper documentation for entry as an immigrant and he
had also been fraudulent in not informing the authorities of a change
in circumstances, the INS opted for deportation on the basis of the
alien's excludability at entry under sections 212(a)(19) and
212(a)(20).2 4 The court should be applauded for its recognition of the
principle laid down in Errico that section 241(f) waives any deporta-
tion charge that results directly from fraud regardless of the section
under which the charge is brought. 5 In this respect, it must be said
that no tribunal has demonstrated why an alien must be deprived of
section 241(f) benefits simply because the fraud perpetrated has
resulted in a violation of another section of the immigration law. In
Persaud, the alien's entry into the United States and his subsequent
illegal status were occasioned directly by his assertion of a relation-
ship which had ceased to exist. In view of these circumstances, the
court was correct in not permitting its attention to be diverted to
other immigration violations caused essentially by the alien's
fraud.26 In any consideration of the operative effect of section 241(f),
these violations should be regarded as subsidiary to the main issue.
This is not to suggest that an alien is any less blameworthy for his
infringements. But within the context of the Act, it is a matter of
deciding whether the congressional purpose to preserve family unity
can be thwarted by a retreat to other obscure provisions which flow
directly from the alien's fraud, which is itself forgiven by section
241(f).
The spectre of Reid reappeared recently in Cacho v. INS.27 In that
case an alien who was already married wed an American citizen and,
therefore, he was able to enter the United States as her immediate
relative. 28 Because of his alleged status, the alien was not required to
201(a), (b), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(a), (b) (West Supp. 1977). Sections 201 and 202 have
been amended by the I. & N. Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 2 &
3, 90 Stat. 2703, but those amendments would not have affected the alien's status
in this case.
24. The § 212(a)(19) basis referred to the fraud committed because the alien
did not inform the INS of the change in his circumstances occasioned by his
wife's death. The § 212(a)(20) basis rested on the alien's visa, which became
invalid once he was no longer the spouse of an American citizen. I. & N. Act §
241(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1970); id. § 212(a)(19), (20), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19),
(20).
25. 537 F.2d at 778, quoting appropriate language from Errico.
26. Id. at 779. The court regarded a § 212(a)(20) violation as an offense which is
included in the § 212(a)(19) violation. The fraudulent act caused the visa to take
on an aspect of invalidity.
27. 547 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir. 1976).
28. An immediate relative is admissible without regard to any numerical
limitations. I. & N. Act § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1970).
seek a labor certification. When the INS ascertained the alien's
fraud, it sought deportation under section 241(a)(1), based on the
failure of the alien to obtain a labor certification under section
212(a)(14)29 and also on the alien's invalid immigrant visa under
section 212(a)(20).30 Although the court took the view that Beid did
not prevent the operation of section 241(f) in connection with the
section 212(a)(20) charge, it found the alien deportable under section
212(a)(14) because of the missing labor certification.
31
Although the court was correct in its decision on the application of
section 241(f) to a charge of deportability based on the exclusion
provisions of section 212(a)(20), it is submitted that the court should
have applied section 241(f) in the same way so as to qualify the alien
for relief as a result of his failure to comply with section 212(a)(14). It
must be noted that as an immediate relative of a United States
citizen, the alien was not required to seek labor certification in order
to enter the United States, 2 and that if section 241(f) forgave the
fraud surrounding his marriage, then it would seem that the for-
giveness of that fraud should carry with it the forgiveness of his
failure to seek the necessary labor certification. If the fraudulent act
of which the alien was accused had not been queried, the alien would
have been admissible without a labor certification. How then can the
alien be forgiven for his violation and at the same time the labor
certification requirement be imposed as a condition of that for-
giveness? It would seem that such an act would constitute an empty
gesture for purposes of satisfying the statute.
The correct approach to the application of section 241(f) would be
to treat as fulfilled that condition around which the alien's fraud
revolves and to look to other requirements of the immigration law to
fulfill the "otherwise admissible" ingredient. Thus, the court in
Cacho should have paid closer attention to the Errico doctrine, for
there seems to be a closer comparison between the quota require-
ments discussed in that case and the labor certification requirement
29. With certain exceptions, aliens coming to the United States to work must
obtain certification from the Secretary of Labor that there are not enough
workers available here to perform the same work. If Mr. Cacho's marriage had
been valid, he would not have required labor certification because he would
have fallen within one of the exemptions as the spouse of an American citizen.
Id. § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14).
30. Id. § 212(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20). This section renders excludable an
alien who does not have valid documentation at the time entry is sought.
31. 547 F.2d at 1062. It must be pointed out that the alien had divorced his
prior wives and had married a permanent resident alien subsequent to his entry.
That union established the relationship necessary for the invocation of § 241(f).
32. See note 29 supra. The 1976 Amendments would not change this portion
of the law. I. & N. Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 5, 90 Stat. 2705
(codified at I. & N. Act § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(14) (West Supp. 1977)).
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of Cacho. In suggesting Errico as the appropriate precedent for
resolution of a case like Cacho, one must necessarily part company
with Reid because Reid recognized Errico as extending section
241(f) to grounds of excludability under section 212(a)(19) only. Such
a restrictive reading of Errico would have the effect of absolving the
alien in Cacho of his misconduct, but at the same time not regarding
him as the spouse of an American citizen at entry. Thus, he would
have had to seek the labor certification in order to enter the United
States.
It is not clear why the Cacho court was able to see a distinction
between the valid immigrant visa requirement and the labor certifi-
cation requirement for purposes of the application of section 241(f).33
The reason that the alien did not have a valid immigrant visa was
because he was not validly married to his purported American wife.
The reason that he did not have any labor clearance was that it was
not required if his marriage to this American was a valid one. It was
appropriate then to treat the labor certification requirement as if it
had been a part of the general documentary requirements for enter-
ing aliens. In this respect, it can be more readily seen that the alien's
fraudulent conduct resulted in a dispensation of the labor certifica-
tion requirement because of the status which he claimed. 4 It is
suggested that in ignoring this fact, the court in Cacho35 relied heavi-
ly on the Court's contentionin Reid that section 241(f) does not apply
where the INS prefers a ground for deportation other than one based
on the excludability provisions of section 212(a)(19).
There is no doubt that Reid's construction of Errico misled the
Cacho court into thinking that the section 241(f) waiver did not
apply to a section 212(a)(14) exclusion simply because the latter
section does not involve quotas. The court in Cacho cannot be
33. 547 F.2d at 1061-62. The court felt that § 212(a)(14) dealt ,i-th an indepen-
dent ground for the alien's exclusion-that is, the sfate of the labor market. But
if the alien had procured labor certification by fraud, would he then not be
entitled to § 241(f) consideration? By the same token his marriage to an Ameri-
can citizen removed the labor certification requirement and therefore, if the
fraud underlying that marriage is forgiven, the correlative labor certificate
should also be forgiven if § 241(f) is to have any effect.
34. If the alien's marriage was regarded as valid, so that the labor certificate
was dispensed with, then there should be no problem about § 241(f) relief. The
labor certificate would not be necessary if the alien was the spouse of an
American citizen. This approach is very similar to avoiding quota requirements
as in Errico.
35. 547 F.2d at 1061.
criticized too harshly for this approach because Reid did in effect
place that construction on Errico; and it is unfortunate because the
latter Court was quite prepared to grant a section 241(f) waiver
where the charge resulted directly from the alien's fraud, despite the
INS's dependence on another section. It is questionable indeed
whether Errico should be read as restricting the waiver to grounds of
excludability predicated on section 212(a)(19) only. Neither should
the waiver be restricted to fraud dealing with quota requirements.
Further evidence may be garnered for the proposition that section
241(f) relief is not restricted to the case where deportation is based on
the cognate provisions of section 241(a)(1) and section 212(a)(19). A
reflective look at section 241(c) 3 6 will indicate that the INS will
regard an entry as questionable if the marriage which formed the
basis for the issuance of the immigrant's visa was entered into less
than two years before the entry and terminated less than two years
thereafter. The interesting feature of section 241(c) is that unless the
alien can establish to the Attorney General's satisfaction that the
marriage was not intended as a vehicle for evading the immigration
laws, the alien is deportable not only under section 241(a)(1) because
of his excludability at entry under section 212(a)(19), but also under
section 241(a)(2) as an alien who is in'the United States in violation of
the immigration laws. Thus, within this very section dealing with the
classes of deportable aliens there is an acknowledgment that a single
fraudulent act may constitute grounds for deportation under two
subsections of section 241(a). If this is to be read, therefore, as pro-
viding a choice for the INS to select thp appropriate section for
deportation based on the alien's fraudulent marriage, there is a
stronger case for an appropriate amendment to section 241(f).
Section 241(c) provides some basis for the view that as far as
section 241(f) is concerned, sections 241(a)(1) and 241(a)(2) are not
necessarily independent grounds for deportation.37 It is evident that
the same fraudulent marriage may lead to deportation on two
grounds: sections 241(a)(1) and 241(a)(2). Thus the Court's rationale
in Reid that entry without inspection is a wholly independent basis
for deportation is not quite convincing when considered in relation to
36. I. & N. Act § 241(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(c) (1970), creates a presumption of fraud
with respect to a marriage that takes place within two years before, and is
terminated within two years after the alien's entry.
37. It was important in Reid v. INS that the Court stressed the independence
of the ground in § 241(a)(2) upon which the INS relied for the alien's deportation.
420 U.S. at 623. It is noteworthy, therefore, that § 241(c) regards an entry result-
ing from a fraudulent marriage as a basis for deportation under § 241(a)(1)
because of § 212(a)(19) excludability and also under § 241(a)(2). But both of these
bases depend on the same fraudulent act, and therefore, in that sense, they
cannot be truly independent.
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the requirements of section 241(f). The difficulty in acknowledging
section 241(a)(2) as a separate ground for denying the alien the
remedies of section 241(f) is based on the fact that the Court rested
that independence on the theory that the alien could be deportable
for having entered without inspection regardless of whether exclu-
sion was warranted at the time of entry. But the relevant inquiry
ought to be whether the ground on which the INS has depended for
deportation is rooted in the alien's fraud or willful misrepresenta-
tion. Thus, even if the alien's false claim of citizenship can by any
stretch of the imagination constitute an entry without inspection, it
is suggested that deportation under section 241(a)(1) based on ex-
cludability at entry should be the governing consideration in decid-
ing whether the relief provisions of section 241(f) should be available.
The mere fact that an alien can be deported because he entered
without inspection without being excludable at entry does not mean
that the alien should be denied whatever relief is available where he
was excludable at entry and also entered without inspection or is
within the United States in violation of the immigration law. There
are, in fact, situations where the grounds for deportation are indeed
separate and independent, but they must be distinguished from situ-
ations where a single fraudulent act might constitute several grounds
for deportation because of the peculiar language of the immigration
statutes.38 Therefore, an alien who is deportable because of a fraudu-
lent marriage mentioned in section 241(c) should qualify for section
241(f) relief even though subsection (c) does mention that he would
also be deportable for being present in the United States in violation
of section 241(a)(2).
By the same token, it must be recognized that an alien can be
within the United States in violation of the law without having been
excludable at the time of entry.39 If this is so, then section 241(f) can
be interpreted to exclude such an alien without doing violence to the
language of section 241(a)(2). It all reverts to the basic tenet of Errico
38. Section 241(f) says that the provisions of § 241 relating to the deportation
of aliens on the ground of their excludability because of fraud does not apply in
certain cases. The provisions referred to must mean subsections (a)(1) and (c).
Therefore, even if the INS could charge an alien with violation of § 241(a)(2)
because of the language in subsection (c) dealing with the alien's illegal status in
the United States, it suggested that § 241(f) should still relieve that alien because
it specifically refers to the "provisions" of § 241. I. & N. Act § 241(f), 8 U.S.C. §
1251(f) (1970).
39. For example, if an alien remains beyond his permitted time, the alien is in
violation of law.
that the section should be applied where the basis for deportation is a
direct result of the fraud. It is suggested, therefore, that the appropri-
ate interpretation of section 241(c) is that an alien. engaging in a
fraudulent marriage might still be spared the sanctions of deporta-
tion if he has met the other requirements of section 241(f) despite the
fact that he may also be deemed deportable under section 241(a)(2) as
being in the United States in violation of law. Technically, this is the
only reasonable way of interpreting section 241(f), and the treatment
of an alien's fraudulent conduct with respect to the marriage situa-
tion mentioned in 241(c) indicates that section 241(f) relief was not
intended to be circumvented by the INS's assertion of a claim that
the alien has violated some other part of the immigration law which
would deny him the remedy which the section was intended to
provide.
When all is said and done, the key to the applicability of section
241(f) should be whether the charge results directly from the alien's
misrepresentation; and the substantive issue should not be obscured
by the INS's preference for a charge under a different section.4" If
this approach is not followed, the INS could be in the enviable
position of deciding for itself whether a particular alien should have
the benefit of section 241(f) simply by bringing the appropriate
charge under section 241(a)(1) instead of section 241(a)(2). 41 After all,
the INS need only rely on the language of section 241(a)(2) which
provides for the deportation of the alien if he is in the United States
in violation of any law. That would be a sure method of subjecting
every alien who would ordinarily benefit from section 241(f) to the
harsh penalty of deportation simply because of the language of sec-
tion 241(a)(2).
40. This is the point raised by the court in Cacho v. INS, 547 F.2d 1057, 1061
(1976). Courts should not be misled simply because an alien's fraud may eventu-
ally result in more than one violation of the Act. In this respect the court in
Cacho recognized that a fraudulent marriage would also result in a § 212(a)(20)
violation because of the invalid documentation. Id.
41. Another variation of the same problem arises when an alien is convicted
under a criminal statute for fraudulent conduct and is then rendered deportable
under § 241. Should the alien be able to benefit from § 241(f)? In Deleon v. INS,
547 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1976), an alien was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (1970)
for impersonating another alien. The INS then sought to deport him pursuant to
§ 241(a)(5), which regards conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (1970) as a separate
ground for deportation. The court held that the alien could be deported because
§ 241(f) was not applicable to an alien deportable under § 241(a)(5). Judge Oakes
pointed out in his dissent that the aliens in Errico had also violated 18 U.S.C. §
1546 (1970) by making false statements in the visa application. The question is
whether those aliens would have been denied relief under § 241(f) if they had
been convicted first for making false statements. Deleon v. INS, 547 F.2d 142,
151 (2d Cir. 1976) (Oakes, J., dissenting).
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SECTION 212(c) AND THE ALIEN
Another provision which grants the alien some relief is section
212(c)4 2 of the Act, which permits the Attorney General to exercise
discretion to admit an alien who may be excludable under some
provisions of section 212(a).43 This provision was previously inter-
preted as applying only to aliens who were returning to a lawful
domicile of seven consecutive years." Subsequently, it was amended
to apply only to permanent resident aliens who were returning to a
lawful domicile of seven consecutive years.45 However, even before
the 1952 amendment, the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) had
extended the precursor of section 212(c) to an alien in a deportation
proceeding,46 and this protection was granted even though the alien
had not left the country subsequent to the conviction which gave rise
to the deportation.47 It was even applied in the situation where the
alien petitioned for adjustment of status under section 245,48 because
the Board saw no valid reason for denying eligibility for that discre-
tionary relief simply because the alien was not returning to the
United States after a voluntary departure.49
Recently, though, the Board denied that section 212(c) applied to
an alien who had not left the country since his narcotics conviction.,"
42. I. & N. Act § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1970) provides as follows:
(c) Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporar-
ily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation,
and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven
consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney
General without regard to the provisions of paragraphs (1)-(25), (30), and
(31), of subsection (a) of this section. Nothing contained in this subsec-
tion shall limit the authority of the Attorney General to exercise the
discretion vested in him under section 1181(b) of this title.
43. Id. § 212(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a) (West Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of
Oct. 12, 1976, Pub. L. 94-484, § 601(a), 90 Stat. 2300; Act of Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. 94-
571, § 5, 7(d), 90 Stat. 2705, 2706. This section prescribes the general classes of
aliens excludable from admission for various reasons.
44. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, Pub. L. No. 301, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 878, prescribed
general classes of excludable aliens. However, one of the exceptions was couch-
ed as follows: "Provided further, that aliens returning after a temporary ab-
sence to an unrelinquished United States domicile of seven consecutive years
may be admitted in the discretion of the Secretary of Labor, and under such
conditions as he may prescribe."
45. See note 42 supra.
46. In re L., 1 I. & N. Dec. 1 (1940).
47. In re A., 2 I. & N. Dec. 459 (1946).
48. I. & N. Act § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970) (amended 1976).
49. In re Smith, 111. & N. Dec. 325 (1965).
50. In re Arias-Uribe, 13 I. & N. Dec. 696 (1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir.
In reaching its decision, the Board stressed the fact that the 1952
amendment clearly requires the alien to be returning from a tempo-
rary departure abroad."' This construction of the statute was chal-
lenged in Francis v. INS 2 on the ground that it denied an alien equal
protection of the laws in violation of the fifth amendment. The basic
query in Francis was whether it was reasonable for the Government
to make a distinction between two aliens simply because one alien
was returning after a temporary departure whereas the other alien
had never left the United States. In applying the minimal scrutiny
test, the court examined the policy for the Board's distinctions in the
application of section 212(c). The policy seemed to be based on Con-
gress' intent that certain returning residents should not be denied the
opportunity of rejoining their families despite their excludability.
But if that was the case, there was no rational basis for distinguish-
ing between an alien who had remained in the United States and one
who was returning after a temporary visit abroad.5 ' They could both
be in the same position except for the simple fact of departure. In
fact, the alien who has never left the United States may have a
sounder case for dispensation. Thus the court in Francis reached the
substance of the matter by holding that the alien was denied equal
protection of the laws because the statute as interpreted denied relief
to the alien simply because he had not left the United States after the
grounds for his deportation had arisen.
Nor was the constitutional infirmity cured by the existence of
section 244(a)(2).5 4 Even though the Attorney General could exercise
discretion with respect to deportable aliens who had been in the
country for ten years, such an alien would still be entitled to discre-
tionary consideration under section 24415 if his sojourn abroad was
brief enough so as not to constitute an interruption of his continuous
presence in the United States. Therefore, the result under the Gov-
ernment's position would be that one alien might conceivably qualify
for relief under both section 244(a)(2) and section 212(c) whereas
another who had never left the United States would not be able to
qualify for relief under section 212(c).1
6
1972). See also Dunn v. INS, 499 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1106 (1975).
51. The language of § 212(c) seems to restrict the statutory remedy to aliens
returning after a temporary sojourn abroad. See note 42 supra.
52. 532 F.2d.268 (2d Cir. 1976).
53. Id. at 272. See also In re Edwards, 10 I. & N. Dec. 506 (1963), where an
alien who was convicted of two crimes was able to show eligibility for § 212(c)
relief because some months after his last conviction he had left for a few hours
to attend a funeral in Canada.
54. I. & N. Act § 244(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2) (1970).
55. Id.
56. 532 F.2d at 273.
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Another question arising under section 212(c) is whether an alien
must have resided in the United States as a permanent resident alien
for a period of seven years in order to benefit from the section. The
forerunner of present section 212(c) did not impose a permanent
residence requirement for aliens to be eligible for discretionary re-
lief. 7 It simply required the alien to be returning to an unrelin-
quished domicile of seven consecutive years. The insertion of the per-
manent residence language irsection 212(c) presented the question of
whether an alien need only have the status of a permanent resident
alien at the time he seeks the benefits of the section or whether the
seven-year unrelinquished domicile must come subsequent to the
assumption of that status.
In re S.58 presented that very question to the Board. The alien
contended for a construction which would have separated the perma-
nent residence requirement from the seven-year requirement. The
Board's resort to legislative history indicated that the question was in
fact discussed during congressional deliberations on the Act and it
was apparently suggested that the words "established after a lawful
entry for permanent residence" should be inserted to modify the
domicile requirement.5 9 Despite the suggestion, the Senate Commit-
tee finally recommended that the section be restricted to aliens hav-
ing the status of lawful permanent residents who were returning to a
lawful domicile of seven consecutive years. 0 A fair reading of that
recommendation would indicate that the permanent resident's status
should be determined as of the time of return to that lawful domicile.
If this result was not intended, then it would seem that additional
language would have been required to relate the concept of perma-
nent residence status to the seven-year period. In In re S., the Board
viewed the plain language of section 212(c) as requiring the alien to
reside for seven consecutive years subsequent to lawful admission for
permanent residence.6 In reaching this conclusion, it said that the
section should apply "only to those lawfully resident aliens who are
returning to an unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years
subsequent to a lawful entry.
' 6 2
57. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, Pub. L. No. 301, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 878.
58. 5 I. & N. Dec. 116 (1953).
59. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 384 (1950).
60. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1952).
61. 5 I. & N. Dec. at 118.
62. Id. In construing the plain language of the statute, the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals used the term "lawful entry" somewhat erroneously, in the sense
This question arose again in the case of Tim Lok v. INS,63 where
the alien contended that the section only required a lawful domicile
of seven years as long as he was a lawful permanent resident at the
time that he sought to invoke it. The court considered the legislative
history of the section and concluded that the seven-year period re-
ferred only to the alien's lawful domicile and did not regard that
period as applying to the permanent residence of the alien, although
the court agreed that the alien must be a permanent resident at the
time that he seeks the benefits of section 212(c).64 It is suggested that
the court in Tim Lok construed the section correctly. An individual
who is returning to a lawful domicile of seven years has established
relationships and, having begun permanent residence, has further
indicated a willingness to establish roots in the United States. If
Congress wanted to restrict the benefits of section 212(c) to those
aliens who had established permanent residence of at least seven
years standing, it would have said that in the same way that it has
prescribed a certain period of residence for those seeking American
citizenship. 6 Congress has indeed prescribed the requirement of per-
manent residence, but it has tied the seven-year requirement to
lawful domicile only. Therefore, once the alien has established his
lawful status as a permanent resident, he should be able to utilize any
previous time spent lawfully within the United States, even in a
temporary status, as a basis for the invocation of section 212(c).
Section 212(c) may be invoked in another context. In Vissian v.
INS,66 the INS sought to deport an alien on the basis of section
241(a)(11)67 instead of section 241(a)(1), which relates to the exclu-
sion provisions of section 212(a)(23). 68 The court took a liberal ap-
that an entry can be made by someone other than a permanent resident. What
the Board of Immigration Appeals probably meant was "lawful admission for
permanent residence."
63. 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977).
64. Id. at 41.
65. I. & N. Act § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1970), provides in pertinent part:
(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall
be naturalized unless such petitioner, (1) immediately preceding the date
of filing his petition for naturalization has resided continuously, after
being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United
States for at least five years ....
It is clear from the above language that the required period of residence does
not commence until the alien has been admitted for permanent residence.
66. 548 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1977).
67. I. & N. Act § 241(a)(11), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1970), provides in effect for
the deportation of aliens who are narcotics addicts or who deal in narcotics. See
also id. § 212(a)(23), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(23).
68. If the alien's deportation had been sought under § 241(a)(1), because of the
§ 212(a)(23) excludability provision dealing with narcotics violations, the alien
would have been eligible for a waiver under § 212(c) nunc pro tunc. The basic
question was whether this same relief should be available if deportation was
sought under § 241(a)(11), which is not tied to excludability at entry.
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proach in suggesting that section 212(c) relief should not be denied
an alien simply because he wasnot then a returning resident. Francis
had already regarded this distinction as a denial of equal protec-
tion,6 9 and Vissian was able to cut through the maze to acknowledge
the availability of section 212(c) relief to the alien even though he had
already entered the United States.
The willingness of these courts to reach the substance of the matter
provides real hope that in the future the same approach will be taken
with respect to section 241(f) relief. If an alien is not to be deprived of
section 212(c) remedies simply because he is already in the United
States, then an alien ought not to be deprived of section 241(f) relief
simply because the INS prefers a charge which may also be covered
under another section of the immigration statutes.70
It seems now that the waiver of inadmissibility under section
212(c) will be granted to a permanent resident alien even though he
may not have left the United States subsequent to the act which
rendered him deportable. 1
SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION
An alien who is in the United States illegally lives in fear of
deportation. The prospect of deportation is even more disturb-
ing when he has lived in this country for a considerable period of
time. In certain cases it is this longevity that will accrue to the benefit
of the alien. He may then be able to qualify for suspension of depor-
tation under section 244.72 Section 244(a)(1) includes aliens who are
69. 532 F.2d at 273.
70. This problem seems to be quite similar to the one raised in connection
with § 241(f). Is the alien to be denied relief simply because the INS utilizes as a
ground for deportation a provision which provides an illusion of separateness
and independence?
71. Vissian v. INS, 548 F.2d 325 (10th Cir. 1977); Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268
(2d Cir. 1976).
72. I. & N. Act § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1970), provides as follows:
(a) As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General
may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an
alien who applies to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation
and-
(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the
provisions specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been
physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not
less than seven years immediately preceding the date of such applica-
tion, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a person
of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would in
the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the
deportable for grounds less serious than those mentioned in section
244(a)(2), and, therefore, the requirements for discretionary relief
under subsection (1) are somewhat less exacting.
Under section 244(a)(1), the alien must have been physically pres-
ent in the United States for a continuous period of at least seven
years. However, the continuity of that physical presence is not bro-
ken by occasional overseas visits." A meaningful interruption of the
alien's continuous physical presence depends on the duration of ab-
sence, the purpose behind the trip, and the planning involved to
accomplish the particular departure. 4 Relying on this standard,
some courts have held that a brief trip to Mexico did not break the
continued physical presence for purposes of satisfying the statute."
Moreover, for purposes of determining whether the alien has fulfilled
the continuous presence requirement, it should not matter whether
the original entry was illegal. This interpretation is in keeping with
the intent of the statute to forestall the deportation of an alien in
appropriate circumstances.
Occasionally though, a court will find that the alien's physical
presence has been interrupted because of an original illegal entry,
followed by a departure and a deceptive reentry. Thus, in Heitland v.
INS16 the court seemed distressed by the alien's illegal status and
held that the alien could not expect to benefit from his illegal entry in
order to qualify under section 244(a)(1) for discretionary relief. One
would have thought that the alien's illegal status in this country
would not have made him ineligible for relief in view of the Board's
previous holding in In re Wong, where the alien's original entry was
illegal and was followed by an entry without inspection."
alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence; or
(2) is deportable under paragraphs (4), (5), (6), (7), (11), (12), (14), (15),
(16), (17), or (18) of section 1251(a) of this title; has been physically
present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than
ten years immediately following the commission of an act, or the
assumption of a status, constituting a ground for deportation, and
proves that during all of such period he has been and is a person of
good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the
opinion of the Attorney General, result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is
a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence.
73. Git Foo Wong v. INS, 358 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1966); In re Harrison, 13 1. & N.
Dec. 540 (1970).
74. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963).
75. Yanez-Jacquez v. INS, 440 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1971); Git Foo Wong v. INS,
358 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1966).
76. 551 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1977).
77. 12 1. & N. Dec. 271 (1967). As a matter of fact, the alien had made about five
trips to Canada to visit his family. Yet, the Board of Immigration Appeals did
not regard him as ineligible for relief simply because of his subsequent decep-
tive entries.
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While the alien's conduct in Heitland was by no means commend-
able, the court's conclusion that the alien's presence was not continu-
ous simply because he had violated the immigration law by reenter-
ing without permission ignored the trend relating to the availability
of relief and the interpretation of the continuous residence require-
ment. Rosenberg v. Fleuti,78 for instance, did not prescribe a magical
formula for determining whether the interruption of an alien's phys-
ical presence was meaningful. But, under the principles discussed in
that case, the appropriate query is whether the interruption is a
significant one in light of its consequences. 9 The aliens in Heitland
did obtain passports and visas for their journey to Germany and,
therefore, according to the Fleuti criteria, that was a significant
element in passing on the aliens' awareness of the implications in-
volved in their departure from the country.
The Heitland court was perhaps confused in its application of
another criterion set forth by the Fleuti Court, which had to do with
the alien's purpose for leaving the country. The latter Court had
suggested that a departure to achieve some illegal objective would be
a strong indication of a meaningful interruption of the alien's physi-
cal presence.8" In Heitland the aliens engaged in certain conduct to
avoid the strictures of the immigration law, but it cannot be deduced
from this activity that they had an interest in accomplishing some
objective which was contrary to the policy of the immigration laws.8 '
Surely they did not leave the United States simply to see if they could
evade the immigration inspectors upon their return. Their purpose in
departing was to visit a sick relative in Germany. Strictly speaking,
the purpose was essentially commendable and the court's invocation
of the Fleuti criterion in this respect rendered meaningless the dis-
cretionary relief available in section 244. After all, any alien who
leaves the United States and tries to resume his illegal status could
never qualify for section 244 protection under the Heitland ap-
proach.82 Simply because the aliens had originally entered illegally,
78. 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
79. Id. at 462.
80. Id.
81. If the objective to leave the United States and return undetected is itself
sufficient to break the continuity of the alien's physical presence, then it is
suggested that such a conclusion must be reached without regard to whether the
alien has made an entry. The criterion of leaving with a fixed illegal objective is
not necessarily fulfilled simply because an alien hopes to reenter without reveal-
ing his true status.
82. The requirements of § 244(a)(1) concern the alien's physical presence, his
good moral character, and extreme hardship to the alien or a spouse, parent, or
the court took the view that they could entertain no reasonable
expectations of remaining in the United States for a further period of
time or of being readmitted once they had departed. But the applica-
tion of relief in this type of a case does not depend on the alien's
reasonable expectations concerning the possibility of securing per-
mission to remain in the United States. Application for discretionary
relief should be predicated on fulfillment of the criteria set forth in
the appropriate section.
The aliens' procurement of the necessary documentation for depar-
ture to Germany was significant only to the planning that was re-
quired for their trip. Perhaps the court in Heitland placed too much
emphasis on the fraudulent aspects of the aliens' reentry and their
illegal presence in the United States. In doing so, it impliedly created
a distinction for purposes of section 244 relief8 3 between an alien who
is legally within the United States and one who is not. It is suggested
that this distinction should be left to the Attorney General's discre-
tion in each particular case, and that it ought not to be regarded as a
disqualifying feature with respect to an alien's application under
that section. The question should not be whether the section 244
remedy provides a reward for the alien's misleading conduct. If that
were the governing standard, there would be very few cases where an
alien could benefit from suspension of deportation. It is submitted,
therefore, that an alien should still be eligible for consideration even
though his original entry was illegal and a subsequent entry was
accomplished by less than candid methods. The alien who most needs
section 244 protection is the alien who is enduring illegal status in
the United States but at the same time has cultivated relationships
that would render it extremely difficult for him to sever his ties here.
Another requirement of section 244(a)(1) is that extreme hardship
would result either for the alien personally or for a child,84 spouse or
parent. The requirement of "extreme hardship" in section 244(a)(1) is
different from the requirement of "exceptional and extremely unusu-
al hardship" in section 244(a)(2) for aliens who are deportable on
more serious grounds. While it has been said that economic hardship
child. If applied strictly only to those aliens whose seven-year residence period
was sanctioned by the INS, the section would benefit limited classes of aliens-
for instance, students and others whose stay will normally be expected to last a
substantial period of time. But the suspension is intended to have wider applica-
tion. After all, the alien may be deportable because he has in fact stayed beyond
the period originally granted by the INS.
83. But in so doing the court should have been reminded that the reason an
alien seeks suspension from deportation is that the alien believes himself qual-
ified for relief despite deportability. To qualify, the alien must be "deportable."
I. & N. Act § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1970).
84. The term child is defined in id. § 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(b)(1) (West
Supp. 1977).
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alone is not sufficient ground for invoking section 244,85 the reality is
that the economic thread runs through a great number of section 244
cases.8 6 Whether it be the seven-year or the ten-year residence re-
quirement, the disturbance of an alien's residence in the United
States will normally place him at a severe economic disadvan-
tage. After all, many aliens come to the United States in order to
improve their financial position. The mere fulfillment of the continu-
ous residence requirement stipulated in section 244 suggests a situa-
tion where an alien has built up certain equities. Thus, it is quite
often not simply a question of becoming more affluent in the United
States; it is often a choice between bare survival and a decent exist-
ence. Therefore, while the element of extreme hardship seems per-
fectly logical on its face, it is not so easily applied. When the statute
was amended in 1962,87 the "extreme hardship" language was sub-
stituted in the first category of less serious violations for the previous
language "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship." But the
latter language still applies in the case of serious violations covered
in section 244(a)(2). Clearly then, Congress was trying to impose a
different standard for the two categories.
88
Although it is eminently reasonable to impose a more severe sanc-
tion on aliens with more serious violations, it is suggested that the
application of the present standards creates insuperable difficulties
and that perhaps a more realistic approach needs to be taken for the
treatment of these aliens. It has been proposed that there should be a
return to the old criterion of serious economic detriment.8 9 Although
85. Pelaez v. INS, 513 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975);Fong
Chai Yu v. INS, 439 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1971); Yeung Ying Cheung v. INS, 422 F.2d
43 (3d Cir. 1970); Kasravi v. INS, 400 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1968).
86. See, e.g., Yeung Ying Cheung v. INS, 422 F.2d 43 (3d Cir. 1970); Llacer v.
INS, 388 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1968); In re Lam, 14 1. & N. Dec. 98 (1972); In re H., 5 1.
& N. Dec. 416 (1953).
87. Act of Oct. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, § 4,76 Stat. 1247 (codified atI. & N.
Act § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1970)).
88. With respect to § 244(a)(2), one committee report suggested that special
dispensation should be available to such aliens only if deportation would be
unconscionable. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1952). In the House
Committee it was felt that the alien's circumstances must not only be "unusual"
but also "exceptionally and extremely unusual." H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 62-63 (1952).
89. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE
SHALL WELCOME 215 (Da Capo Press Reprint Ser. 1971) (reprint of the 1953
report of the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization);
Comment, Suspension of Deportation: Illusory Relief, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
229, 255 (1976).
that would be a less stringent standard, at least it would be a recogni-
tion of the realities of the alien's situation without at the same time
diluting the other requirements of good moral character and continu-
ous physical presence.
Suspension of deportation is not available to a native of a country
contiguous to the United States or of an adjacent island unless that
alien shows himself to be ineligible for a non-quota immigrant visa."
Even if the native of a contiguous territory is ineligible for a non-
quota visa, he must still fulfill the other requirements of section 244.
Thus, the alien may be excludable for any reason at all and, there-
fore, may be ineligible to receive an immigrant visa. But the assertion
of a particular ground for excludability may return later to haunt the
alien during subsequent application for an immigrant visa. Whether
that is desirable is certainly debatable. The alien can become en-
trapped in a situation where attempts to establish grounds for discre-
tionary relief under section 244 may eventually operate to deny him
an immigrant visa. It is reasonable to assume that if the proviso of
section 244(f) is interpreted as referring only to the alien's ineligibili-
ty for a non-quota immigrant visa, then the difficulties envisaged
under the previous language will to some extent be obviated.
One would think that the recent amendment of section 2451 per-
mitting Western Hemisphere aliens to qualify for adjustment of status
within the United States would have been an incentive for amend-
ment of section 244 by removing the contiguous territory exception.
It is not clear why this exception should be sustained. If it is to
destroy the incentive of those alien visitors whose proximity to this
country's shores entices them to seek immigrant status, it is question-
able whether this objective has been accomplished. If an alien has
fulfilled the other requirements of section 244, it does not seem
particularly admirable to deny him the remedies of that statute
simply on the basis of the territory's proximity. Furthermore, in
certain circumstances, the alien may be driven to find some basis of
ineligibility for a visa so as to fulfill the prerequisites of the statutory
exception. Unfortunately that ineligibility may be subsequently in-
voked to deny the individual entry into the United States. Although
the ill effects of this exception have been attenuated by the recent
amendments to the Act, it must be said that they cannot be totally
removed without the deletion of that exception in section 244(f).
90. I. & N. Act § 244(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(f) (1970). Before the 1976 amendments,
the term non-quota immigrant was interpreted as special immigrant. See
C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.9c (rev. ed.
1975); Comment, Suspension of Deportation: Illusory Relief, 14 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 229, 248-50 & n.113.
91. I. & N. Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 6, 90 Stat. 2705
(amending I. & N. Act § 245, 8 U.S.C. 1255 (1970)).
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CONCLUSION
An attempt has been made in this Article to explore some of the
troublesome nuances of the Act. Existing difficulties have been
caused mostly by different judicial approaches to the purposes and
philosophy of the immigration legislation. Because the Act is so
comprehensive, much discretionary relief is available to the alien.
With respect to section 241(f), there should be some legislative
clarification of the intended scope of the remedy. It is a futile exer-
cise for fraud or misrepresentation to be forgiven under one section
only to have it invoked as a sword under another. If an alien has
procured a visa or other documentation by fraud, he will be in the
United States illegally and, therefore, could be deprived of his sec-
tion 241(f) remedies through the application of another section.
The same thing may be said about inspection. If eligibility for the
statutory pardon depends upon the type of fraud committed by the
alien, the statute should state this specifically to resolve any linger-
ing doubts.92 The judicial interpretation concerning the types of
fraud envisaged by section 241(f) cannot be sustained either by the
language of the statute or its legislative history. This is not to suggest
that there may not be certain degrees of culpability in connection
with an alien's fraudulent entry into the United States. However, it is
respectfully suggested that the statute does not delineate these dif-
ferences and there is really nothing open for judicial interpretation.
Furthermore, some action is necessary if the INS is to be regarded as
prohibited from invoking a section which would effectively deny the
remedy of section 241(f) if the charge is directly related to fraud or
misrepresentation.
Section 212(c) should also be amended to reflect the availability of
the remedy to an alien who has not left the United States but is
otherwise eligible for the protection of that section. After all, the
important ingredients seem to be lawful permanent residence and the
seven-year period. Perhaps the language of the section can be
clarified to show that the seven-year domicile requirement need not
be compiled subsequent to the alien's admission as a permanent
resident.
As far as section 244 is concerned, there may be a legitimate
basis for making a distinction between minor and major viola-
92. There may be good reason for making a distinction between the types of
fraud to be protected. But this should not be implied in a deportation statute.
tions for the purposes of prescribing the eligibility requirements for
discretionary relief. However, it is not clear that the terms "extreme
hardship" and "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" offer
any clear delineation of congressional expectations. When all is said
and done, it is basically a question of economic hardship. While it is
not suggested here that economic hardship should be the single
criterion for eligibility, it seems that the section creates some per-
plexity by setting different hardship standards for the two
categories. Perhaps a more palatable solution might be to impose a
standard of serious economic hardship on both categories of aliens
and to increase the required period of physical presence for those
who are major violators.93 At least the standard would be clearer and
more precise.
93. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION,
WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME 215 (Da Capo Press Reprint Ser. 1971) (reprint of the
1953 report of the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization).
